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Abstract
The formation of interpersonal intentions 
has been a central theme in social-
psychological research for over twenty 
years. Existing psychological models 
propose that attitudes, social norms, and 
moral obligations often combine to form 
intentions. These models will be utilized 
to develop individual indexes of the 
relative influence of attitudes, norms, and 
moral obligations in forming intentions. 
These indexes will then be correlated 
with measures of locus of control, self-
monitoring, and individualism-collectivism 
in order to explore the extent to which 
personal and cultural factors influence the 
intention-formation process.
Introduction
The formation of interpersonal 
intentions has been a central theme 
in social psychological research for 
more than twenty years. An intention 
is defined as a self-instruction to 
perform a specific behavior and is 
usually measured as the estimate of the 
likelihood that a person will perform 
the behavior. Past research suggested 
that intentions could be measured 
through attitudes, although it is very 
difficult to predict behavior with a 
single attitude score (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
1975). Understanding how intentions 
are formed, especially those about social 
behavior, has been considered a major 
theoretical problem in social psychology 
because it is linked to the explanation of 
interpersonal behavior. On the practical 
side, the prediction of social behavior–
especially behavior that is complex and 
needs to be reasoned through–cannot be 
accomplished without access to people’s 
intentions about the behavior.
Fishbein and Ajzen’s model for 
attitudinal prediction of behavior 
suggests that behavior is influenced 
by a person’s intention to perform that 
behavior and that his/her intention, 
in turn, is influenced by two other 
variables: a personal or “attitudinal” 
factor and a social or “normative” factor 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). The central 
equation (1) is as follows:
B ~ BI = [Aact]w0 + [NB (Mc) ]w1
In this equation, B=overt behavior, 
BI=Behavioral Intention, Aact=attitude 
toward the act, NB=Normative Belief, 
Mc=Motivation to comply with the 
normative belief, and w0 and w1 are 
empirically determined weights. The 
behavioral intention in this theory 
refers to a self-instruction to perform 
a given action in a given situation; it is 
the intention to perform the particular 
overt response that is to be predicted. A 
person’s attitude, or his/her evaluation 
towards a specific act (as opposed 
to their attitude towards the object), 
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is proposed to be a function of its 
perceived consequences and its value 
to the individual (Ajzen & Fishbein, 
1973). The normative belief component 
measures the individual’s belief of the 
likelihood that members of a social 
group expect him to perform the 
behavior in question. As the equation (1) 
shows, the effect of the normative belief 
is modified by the individual’s motivation 
to comply with that expectation.
Triandis (1975) also developed a 
model for the prediction of behavior 
similar to that of Fishbein and Ajzen 
(1975). He believes that intentions are a 
function of different social antecedents 
(S) including perceived norms, roles, 
the self-concept, and interpersonal 
agreements; the perceived affect 
associated with the behavior (A); and 
the sum of the perceived consequences 
associated with that behavior (Pc) 
multiplied by the value of each 
consequence (Vc). Different weights, 
γ, δ, and ε, are applied to determine 
whether the person places more 
emphasis on social influences, or S, (γ), 
attitudes, or A, (δ), or consequences and 
their value to the person, or PcVc (ε). 
The equation (2) is as follows:
I = γS + δA + ∑PcVc
There are several other approaches 
to the prediction of behavior. In an 
effort to integrate the existing theories, 
including the above mentioned, the 
National Institute of Mental Health 
sponsored a workshop in which 
Fishbein and Ajzen, Triandis, and 
many other researchers met to develop 
a common theoretical framework 
that integrated the core constructs of 
each theory (Jaccard, Litardo, & Wan, 
1999). The model is organized into two 
sequences, the first of which focuses on 
the immediate determinants of behavior. 
The four variables of this component 
include the individual’s knowledge and 
skills for behavioral performance, the 
motivation to perform the behavior, 
environmental constraints, and salience 
of behavior. The second sequence 
focuses on the determinants of an 
individual’s motivation to perform the 
behavior. The six major variables that 
influence this component are attitudes, 
social norms, expectancies, self-concept, 
affect and emotional reactions, and 
self-efficacy. Demographic, biological, 
and other more distal variables are 
believed to influence through these six 
predictor variables. In addition, the 
relative importance of the determinants 
of behavior may also differ from one 
population to another.
It would appear from the work 
reviewed above that culture must play 
a significant role in the formation 
of intentions. After all, intentions, 
according to the theories reviewed 
above, are a function of, among other 
things, norms, which are influenced 
by culture and various social factors. 
In fact, intentionality itself is a 
psychological construct that must be at 
least partially determined by culture, 
since culture makes a range of behaviors 
available to us to perform. Despite this 
connection, cross-cultural research 
has not paid a lot of attention to this 
problem.
The present theory deals with the 
role culture plays in the formation of 
intentions, at the group level, but more 
importantly, at the individual level. 
As implied earlier, self-instructions 
must have one or more sources–what 
traditional psychologists have called 
“attitudes.” The other source may 
reveal an external influence–what social 
psychologists have called “norms.” 
Further reflection, however, reveals that 
such “external” influences (filtered, of 
course, through the individual’s own 
perceptual system) may themselves 
be of different kinds. For example, 
“norms” may refer to community 
standards–what a person “should” do. 
In addition, however, there may be a 
sense of duty or moral obligation that 
also drives people’s intentions–what a 
person “ought” to do. Some past work 
by psychologists (Davidson, Jaccard, 
Triandis, Morales, Diaz-Guerrero, 1976) 
has alluded to that, but for the most part 
this problem has not been given a lot of 
systematic attention.
The present study will focus on 
these three determinants of (or sources 
of influence on) intentions, and will 
examine how they may differentially 
affect the process of intention formation 
in differing cultural contexts. In 
particular, this approach predicts 
that individualists will be influenced 
primarily by attitudes (affect, personal 
wishes) in forming intentions. According 
to Triandis (1993), individualists have 
an independent self; they choose their 
goals to fit their individual needs instead 
of the group’s; they behave according to 
their attitudes, beliefs, and values; and 
they base their relationships on a cost/
benefit analysis of the relationship. He 
also suggests that collectivist individuals 
are influenced more by “external” 
factors. They are more interdependent, 
choose goals that are compatible with 
their in-group, and emphasize norms 
and relatedness versus rationality as 
determinants of their behavior. However, 
previous research has not differentiated 
between different types of “external” 
sources. In this study, we will explore 
this problem in depth.
Research participants will be asked 
to indicate their intentions to perform 
a number of different behaviors from a 
variety of domains in their lives (e.g., 
financial decisions, personal lives/
relationships). They will also respond 
to a number of scales measuring the 
extent to which they are influenced by 
attitudes, norms, and moral obligations/
duty. Their responses will be analyzed 
at the individual level in order to create 
a personal “intention profile” for each 
subject. In other words, using multiple 
regression techniques, we will form a 
model showing the extent to which 
each subject’s intentions are generally 
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influenced by attitudes, norms, moral 
obligations, or a combination of the 
three. In other words, the regression 
weights will reflect the extent to which 
attitudes, norms, or moral obligations 
play a systematic role in determining the 
intentions of a particular individual.
Participants will also respond to 
a number of scales measuring stable 
dispositions: self-monitoring, locus of 
control, and individualism-collectivism. 
The self-monitoring scale measures 
the process of making sure that one’s 
behavior conforms with the demands of 
the current social situation. The locus 
of control scale differentiates people 
who believe that they themselves are 
primarily responsible for what happens 
to them from those who believe major 
events in their lives are determined 
mainly by other people or forces 
beyond themselves. The individualism-
collectivism scale measures the degree 
to which people are fundamentally 
independent vs. interdependent. Each 
scale will be used to test a different 
aspect of our approach:
1) For the self-monitoring scale, 
we expect a correlation with the 
intention profile, such that low 
self-monitors will be more likely 
to determine their intentions from 
their attitudes or personal wishes.
2) For the locus of control scale, 
we are looking for discriminant 
validity. In other words, we will try 
to show that the intention profile 
for each subject is different from 
simply a sense of having control 
over one’s life. After all, one’s sense 
of personal self-instruction should 
be psychologically independent of 
being under the control of others.
3) For the individualism-collectivism 
scale, previous research suggests 
that individualists will be more 
likely to be influenced by attitudes 
in determining their intentions, 
whereas collectivists will be 
influenced by duty (Triandis, Ping, 
Chen, & Chan, 1998). However, 
contrary to previous research, we 
expect that norms will be just as 
likely to influence individualists 
as collectivists because all people 
are subject to the influence of 
community standards. It is the 
role of duty that has emerged as 
a significant difference between 
individualists and collectivists in 
recent cross-cultural research (e.g. 
Miller, 1994).
Method
Participants
Fourteen male and 15 female students 
from an Introductory Psychology 
course at Grand Valley State University 
completed the surveys. They received 
academic credit for their participation.
Instruments
Intentions 
A list of 30 intentions and their 
underlying components (attitudes,
subjective norms, and moral 
obligations) was generated following
recommendations by Fishbein and 
Ajzen (1975) and Triandis (1976). An 
effort was made to sample intentions 
from a variety of domains of people’s 
lives, including career/school, personal 
life/dating, family/marriage/children, 
helping others, and finances/purchases. 
Respondents rated the likelihood of the 
statement on a 7-point likely/unlikely 
scale. Examples of the measurement of 
attitudes, subjective norms, and moral 
obligations for an intention involving 
family relationships follow:
Example: Intention
I intend to call or talk to my family very 
often while in college.
likely :_:_:_:_:_:_:_: unlikely
Example: Attitude
Calling or talking to my family very 
often while in college is
good :_:_:_:_:_:_:_: bad 
unimportant :_:_:_:_:_:_:_: important
wise :_:_:_:_:_:_:_: foolish
Example: Subjective Norm
Most people who are important to me 
think that I should call or talk to my 
family very often while in college.
agree :_:_:_:_:_:_:_: disagree 
Example: Moral Obligation
I feel a moral obligation or duty to call 
or talk to my family very often while in 
college.
agree :_:_:_:_:_:_:_: disagree
Individualism-Collectivism Scale
This scale measures the degree to 
which respondents are individualists 
or collectivists. Individualists are not 
as integrated with others and with the 
social environment as are those who are 
collectivists (Hui, 1988). They believe 
they can survive independently and 
therefore define the self as separate from 
the group. Collectivists see themselves 
more as members of a group and define 
the self as interdependent with others. 
The scale consists of 29 items that are 
all measured on a 7-point agree/disagree 
scale. An example of a scale item 
appears below:
When another person does better than I 
do, I get tense and aroused.
agree :_:_:_:_:_:_:_: disagree
Self-Monitoring Scale
This scale measures the degree to 
which respondents observe and 
control their self-presentation and 
expressive behavior (Snyder, 1974). 
Those who score high on the scale are 
said to modify their self-presentation 
and their behavior according to the 
social situation. Those who score low 
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behave more independently of the 
social situation. The scale consists of 25 
items, and respondents have to answer 
whether they consider the statement to 
be true or false. An example of a scale 
item appears below:
When I am uncertain how to act in a 
social situation, I look to the behavior of 
others for cues.  T_____ F_____
Locus of Control Scale
This scale measures the degree to 
which respondents believe that they are 
responsible for what happens in their 
lives or the degree to which they believe 
that external forces control their destinies 
(Levenson, 1973). Those who score high 
believe that they are in control of their 
lives, and those who score low believe 
that chance, fate, and powerful others 
have more control over their destinies. 
The scale consists of 24 items, measured 
on a 7-point agree/disagree scale. An 
example of a scale item appears below:
To a great extent my life is controlled by 
accidental happenings.
agree :_:_:_:_:_:_:_: disagree 
Five random orders will be generated for 
the items of the four scales to reduce any 
fatigue effects. Research participants will 
be informed of the general purpose of the 
study and given one hour to complete the 
surveys. At the end of the experimental 
session, each participant will be debriefed 
about the nature of the study and given a 
chance to ask questions.
Results
A multiple regression was computed for 
each subject’s responses. The dependent 
variable was the intention, and the 
predictors were the attitude, calculated 
as the mean of three items, social norms, 
and moral obligations. The central 
equation of the theory is as follows:
I = ω1 A + ω 2 SN + ω 3 MO (3)
In this equation, I = Intention, A = 
Attitude, SN = Social Norms, and 
MO = Moral Obligations. ω1, ω1, and 
ω1 are the standardized regression 
weights computed for each of the 
three predictors. They were used in 
subsequent analyses as indexes of 
the importance of each of the three 
predictors in the decision-making 
process of every individual. 
One of the results we expected to 
find was that individuals who scored 
high on the individualism scale would 
also score high on the attitude scale 
as determinant of their intentions. We 
also expected that individuals scoring 
high on the collectivism scale would 
also score high on social norms and 
moral obligations scales. However, 
correlations among the three predictors 
and the individual’s individualism and 
collectivism scores were not significant. 
The correlation between individualism 
and attitudes was r I, A = -.122, n.s. The 
correlation between collectivism and 
social norms was r COL, SN = -.127, n.s. 
Moreover, contrary to what we expected, 
we found that the correlation between 
individualism and moral obligations 
was higher than that of collectivism and 
moral obligations, with r I,MO = .252, n.s.
Correlations were also computed 
between the predictors and the self-
monitoring and locus of control scales. 
The self-monitoring score was correlated 
with the social norms score, with 
r SM, SN = .409, p<.05; the correlations 
between the attitudes score and that 
of social norms and moral obligations 
were r A, SN = -.458 and r A, MO = -.613, 
respectively. Moreover, we did not 
expect to find any relationship between 
the individuals’ scores on the locus of 
control scale and any of the other scales. 
Indeed the results were not significant, 
except for a marginally significant 
correlation between the individualists 
and their chance score (belief that what 
happens in their life is due to chance), 
with r IND, CH = .345 p=.10.
Discussion
Our hypothesis that individualists were 
going to score high on the attitude scale 
and the collectivists on the social norms 
and moral obligations scales was not 
supported. In fact, though the results 
were still not significant, the opposite 
trend was found with the individualists 
scoring higher on the moral obligations 
scale. One reason for this outcome could 
be the small number of subjects that 
participated in the study. Another reason 
could be that the data were collected 
from a sample in an area of high 
religiosity, and religion usually plays a 
highly significant role in the formation of 
an individual’s moral obligations. 
The correlation between the self-
monitoring score and that of social 
norms suggests that individuals who 
are high self-monitors–meaning that 
they adjust their behavior depending 
on the social situation–also rely on 
social norms in their decision-making 
process. This correlation was predicted 
because high self-monitors follow social 
norms in order to adjust their behavior 
according to the demands of the current 
social situation. 
Another interesting result was 
the higher correlation between the 
individualists and their “chance” score 
from the Locus of Control scale. This 
suggests that individualists tend to 
believe that chance plays a significant 
role in what determines the outcomes 
in their lives. We had predicted that 
there would be no correlation between 
the locus of control scores and the 
collectivism or individualism scores 
because one’s sense of personal self-
instruction should be psychologically 
independent from being under the 
control of others. These results may 
also be due to the small sample in our 
study. Further data collection in order to 
explore these trends is indicated.
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